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ABSTRACT
This paper develops the basis for monetary and exchange rate coordination in Asia as part of a
package of monetary integration that could support growth and poverty reduction.  This could be
achieved  directly  through  coordinated  exchange  rate  stabilization,  and  indirectly  through  the
implications of this for reserve pooling and investment in an Asian development fund (ADF) and
through development of the Asian bond market (ABM).  Macro policy coordination could be viewed
as a necessary condition for further development of both reserve pooling via the Chiang Mai
Initiative (CMI) and of the ABM.  The paper analyzes the trade structure of ASEAN and China in
terms of both geographic sources of imports and markets for exports, and of the commodity structure
of trade.  The similarities of the geographic and commodity trade structures across the region are
consistent with adoption of a common currency basket for stabilization, and with an argument for
monetary integration across the region along the lines of Mundell (1961) on optimum currency areas.
The paper constructs currency baskets and real effective exchange rates (REERs) for the countries
in the region. Since their trade patterns are quite similar and their policies are already implicitly
coordinated, their REERs tend to move together.  This means that ASEAN and China are already
moving toward integration in practical effect.  Explicit movement toward coordination could support
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I.  Introduction.    
  This paper develops the basis for monetary and exchange rate coordination in 
Asia as part of a package of monetary integration that would be aimed at supporting 
growth and poverty reduction.  This could be achieved directly through coordinated 
exchange rate stabilization, and indirectly through the implications of this for reserve 
pooling and investment in an Asian development fund (ADF) and through development 
of the Asian bond market (ABM).  By monetary and exchange rate coordination here we 
mean flexible joint management of exchange rate movements against a common basket 
that is aimed at maintaining real effective exchange rates (REERs) near their equilibrium 
values as underlying real economic conditions evolve.  The paper focuses on establishing 
the conditions for such coordination.    Implications for reserve sharing, the ADF, and 
ABM development are the subject of continuing research. 
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The relationship of exchange rate and macro policy coordination with reserve sharing and 
the ABM is summarized in Figure 1, above.  Macro policy coordination can contribute 
directly to stabilization and growth by crisis prevention and reduction of uncertainty.  It 
could provide the basis for surveillance, activating reserve sharing.  The reduction in the 
demand for reserves at the individual country level could release resources for investment 
in development through the ADF.  Exchange rate stabilization and the additional flow of 
investment resources could stimulate development of the ABM, increasing the efficiency 
of resources for investment in growth and poverty reduction.  Thus macro policy 
coordination could be viewed as a necessary condition for further development of both 
reserve pooling via the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and of the ABM. 
Reserve pooling through the CMI structure and development of the ABM have 
received substantial attention to date.  See, for example, Kuroda and Kawai (2003) and 
Nasution (2005).  The political cooperation involved in the CMI and the rhetorical 
ambition of recent ASEAN and Chiang Mai government statements have been taken by 
many as suggesting a new era in region-wide monetary coordination.  In practical terms 
though, actual progress has been more limited.  The CMI swap agreements have not been 
activated, and the ABM is still mostly denominated in Singapore or US dollars.   
Policy coordination could strengthen the basis for surveillance under the CMI, a 
necessary condition for effective reserve sharing.  Exchange rate stabilization against a 
common basket of currencies could reduce risk in bond markets and facilitate 
development of derivatives and futures.  Just as was the case with European monetary 
coordination (and the use of the European Currency Unit), the common basket could act 
as a focal point for monetary coordination.  Moreover, it could also act as a spur for the 
ABM, in particular through offering a broadly accepted local currency for bond issues.  
These are necessary conditions for development of an active ABM denominated in the 
currencies of the region.  Since macro and exchange rate stabilization seem therefore 
essential for successful development of the CMI and the ABM, this is the focus of this   5 
paper.  In further research, we expect to build on this analysis and look more closely at 
reserve sharing and the ABM. 
  Section II focuses on the potential gains from policy coordination, mainly within 
ASEAN.  These can be separated into three sources.  The first is direct gains from 
stabilization with sustainable macro policies.  These might have prevented the crisis in 
1997-9.  The second is gains from cooperative stabilization to rule out unintended 
competitive devaluations and cascading speculation from market to market as was seen in 
the crisis.  The third is indirect benefits gains in terms of the importance of stabilization 
for CMI and ABM development.  The section focuses on the first two sources of gains, 
using an analytical narrative of the key macro developments in ASEAN since the early 
1990s as its vehicle.  Macro and exchange-rate policy coordination could have at least 
cushioned the effects of the 1997-99 crisis, and prevented at least partially the growth 
slowdown that followed.   
Sections III-V support the analysis presented in section II.  In section III the trade 
structure of ASEAN and China is laid out in terms of both geographic sources of imports 
and markets for exports, and of the commodity structure of trade.  The structure of trade 
by commodity and sources and markets is also summarized for major commodity groups.  
The similarities of the geographic trade structures across the region are consistent with 
adoption of a common currency basket for stabilization.  The similarities of commodity 
structure in trade across the region are consistent with an argument for monetary 
integration across the region along the lines of Mundell (1961) on optimum currency 
areas.  The even distributions of trade across sources and markets for the major 
commodities show that stabilization against a common basket would not create strong 
differential sectoral strains across the region.   
Section IV draws on the geographic data of Section III to construct currency 
baskets and real effective exchange rates (REERs) for the countries in the region.  It 
complements the discussion of Section III, again providing support for the possibility of 
implementing a common (externally-based) currency basket.  Since their trade patterns 
are quite similar and their policies are already implicitly coordinated (see Section V), 
their REERs tend to move together.  This means that ASEAN and China are already 
moving toward integration in practical effect.  Explicit movement toward coordination   6 
could support surveillance and reserve-sharing under the CMI, and release reserves to be 
invested in an ADF.  If these were invested as paid-in capital, this could be leveraged in 
international financial markets.   
Section V draws attention to the effective coordination of monetary policy by 
studying correlations among monthly movements in nominal exchange rates and changes 
in reserve money, representing monetary policy.  The correlations are positive and quite 
strong.  This is consistent with common reactions to common shocks or with attempts to 
maintain exchange rates within a stable zone within the region.  In this case, monetary 
policy coordination is already implicit.  Making the coordination explicit, or even formal, 
could yield the benefits of ruling out competitive devaluations and forestalling cascading 
speculation.  This could contribute to the results for an ADF and development of the 
ABM described above.  Section VI ends with some tentative conclusions and directions 
for further work. 
 
II.  Macro Policy Coordination. 
  This section discusses potential gains from coordinated stabilization of real 
exchange rates, relating them to the crisis of 1997-99 and the periods before and since.  
Exchange rates can be stabilized successfully only if the underlying macroeconomic 
policies are sustainable.  One of the lessons from the crisis is the loss from exchange rate 
stabilization with unsustainable underlying policies and overheating.  Thus “policy 
coordination” here assumes sustainable underlying macro policies.  We discuss losses 
from non-stabilization terms of the events leading to the crisis in 1997-99, the loss of 
output in the crisis, and depressed investment and slower growth since the crisis.  These 
are losses that could have been prevented or at least minimized by sustainable underlying 
macro policies and coordinated exchange-rate policies.  We then go on to discuss 
potential gains from cooperative stabilization, and, more briefly, indirect gains in terms 
of reserve sharing, development of an Asian Development Fund (ADF), and the Asian 
Bond Market (ABM). 
 
Direct Gains from Stabilization: Summary.   7 
  The direct gains from management of exchange rates so as to stabilize a real 
exchange rate come from the stability provided by the underlying macro policies and the 
resulting minimization of exchange risk to investors.  A necessary condition for 
successful stabilization is a sustainable fiscal position that frees monetary policy to target 
inflation with exchange rate stability.  A focus on exchange rate stabilization thus 
requires macro policy sustainability, a lesson learned (and being re-learned) in Europe.    
The data for the ASEAN countries since the early 1990s provide an illustration of 
the problem of exchange rate stabilization without underlying macro sustainability, and 
the loss from failure of stabilization.  The inverse of this loss is the gain from successful 
stabilization.  These data are summarized shown in Graphs 2.1-2.3 (graphs and tables at 
the end).  These summarize the obvious aspects of the crisis and its aftermath.  After this 
summary we turn to data and analysis beneath these summary results.   
Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 show monthly USD exchange rates for the core ASEAN 
countries, indexed to the beginning of 1990.  These are defined as units of home currency 
per dollar, so up is depreciation of the home currency.  The extreme movement of the 
Indonesian rupiah in 1997 distorts the picture in Graph 2.1, so Graph 2.2 eliminates 
Indonesia.  Both graphs show the stable and roughly parallel movement of nominal dollar 
exchange rates before and after the crisis, interrupted by the crisis explosion in 1997-99.  
During the period before the crisis, USD exchange rates were stable in nominal terms.  
But the economies were experiencing investment booms not accompanied by fiscal 
adjustment, as shown in the tables in the next section.  They were overheating, with 
inflation causing real appreciation of their currencies, although they were stable in 
nominal terms against the USD.  They had large and growing current account deficits, 
and growing external debt denominated in foreign exchange.  Thus the growth in the 
current account deficits was accompanied by appreciating real effective exchange rates, 
an unsustainable scenario that can be interpreted as a “bubble” in the FX market.  These 
developments have been analyzed in a large and nuanced literature on the crisis.  This 
includes Branson (2005), presented at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur in 
1998. We will summarize the central lessons of this episode for cooperative stabilization 
below.   8 
  Exchange rate stability was restored in the period after the crisis.  However, this 
period has seen a major depression in investment with current account surpluses.  This is 
consistent with real appreciation, but slower real growth.  The effects of the lack of 
sustainable policies and the breakdown of exchange-rate stability in the crisis are shown 
in Graph 2.3.  There the paths of real GDP are interrupted by the crisis, with serious 
recessions in all the ASEAN countries.  More importantly, none of the countries have 
recovered back to their original growth paths, and in all cases the underlying growth rate 
has been reduced.  The unsustainable earlier policies and the crisis have depressed 
investment, lowered and slowed the real GDP growth path and substantially reduced the 
potential for poverty reduction.  These losses from the failure of stabilization can be 
interpreted as the potential gains from successful stabilization.  
 
Investment, Saving, the Current Account, and REERs since 1990.   
  The data on the current account, the investment-saving balance, and external debt 
for the core ASEAN countries since 1990 are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  The 
time series of the same data are shown in Graphs 2.4-2.7.  The tables show in their first 
three lines the evolution of the current account balance (CAB), investment (I), and saving 
(S), all as percent of GDP.  From the GDP accounts, these are connected by the equation 
CAB = I – S.  The current deficit is the excess of investment over saving.  The current 
deficit must be financed by borrowing abroad, expanding the external debt.  The last line 
of each table shows the path of the debt/GDP ratio for each country.  The paths of the 
effective real exchange rates of the core ASEAN countries are shown in Graph 2.8.  
These are the total trade-weighted indexes from section IV below. We will analyze in 
turn the data for the pre-crisis period, 1990-96, the crisis, 1997-99, and the period since. 
 
Pre-crisis, 1990-96.  With the exception of Singapore, and Indonesia in the early 1990s, 
the tables show substantial and growing current deficits in the period before the crisis.  
These were generated by investment booms, with investment exceeding domestic saving.  
Investment and saving in the tables both include private and public.  Thus the excess of 
investment over saving could have been remedied by an increase in public saving, that is,   9 
a fiscal tightening.  In the absence of fiscal adjustment, the current deficits persisted and 
grew, maintaining or increasing the debt/GDP ratios in the last line of the tables. 
The data for Thailand in Table 2.2 provide a good illustration of the stabilization 
problem before the crisis.  From 1990 to 1996 investment was 41-42 percent of GDP, 
while saving was around 35 percent.  Thus the current deficit stayed near 5 percent of 
GDP, increasing to over 6 percent in 1995-96, before the crisis.  The ratio of external 
debt to GDP increased from 32 percent in 1990 to 62 percent in 1996 and 73 percent in 
1997.  The market could see that this path was unsustainable, and the speculative pressure 
against the Thai baht began the crisis in July 1997.  The depreciation of the baht led to 
contagion across the region, and the cascade of devaluations shown in Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 
above.  Thus the crisis was the combined effect of unsustainable underlying 
macroeconomic policies and the lack of cooperative macro policy management. 
The graphs show basically the same pattern for all the core ASEAN countries 
except Singapore.  The investment ratios in Graph 2.4 are high and rising in the period up 
to 1997.  The exception is Singapore, with investment fluctuating around 35 percent of 
GDP.  The picture for saving is less clear in Graph 2.5.  Thailand, Indonesia, and 
especially Philippines have saving ratios that are flat or falling.  Malaysia’s saving ratio 
increases during the period, and all the way until 1998.  But through 1995, it is lower than 
the rising investment ratio in Graph 2.5.  Singapore’s saving ratio is rising until 1998, and 
exceeds investment. 
  The external consequences of the investment boom underfinanced by domestic 
saving are shown in Graphs 2.6 and 2.7.  Graph 2.6 shows the decreasing current account 
balances for all the core ASEAN countries except Singapore.  Thailand’s and the 
Philippines’ deficits are the most negative.  Malaysia and Indonesia are closer to zero, 
with Malaysia’s deficit diminishing after 1995.  These patterns of current account 
balances are reflected in the debt/GDP ratios of Graph 2.7.  With rapid GDP growth, the 
debt ratios of all but Thailand are stable until 1996-7.  Thailand’s debt ratio rises 
throughout the period 1990-1998, with an increase in its growth rate in 1994.  This 
rapidly rising debt ratio is a signal of potential unsustainability, which led to the onset of 
the crisis in 1997.     10 
The depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997, shown in Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 
earlier, brought competitive pressure on the other ASEAN countries.  This pressure was 
perceived by the markets, leading to cascading speculation and the devaluations in the 
other ASEANs.  The source of the competitive pressure is in the similarity of their trade 
patterns, shown in section III below.  The contagion of this pressure is one argument for 
cooperative exchange-rate management. 
   Movements of the REERs of the core ASEAN countries from 1990 are shown in 
Graph 2.8, moved forward from section IV on REERs.  These are the REERs based on 
total trade weights for the six major markets outside ASEAN+1, indexed to 1989 = 100.  
In the graph, an upward movement is a depreciation of the home currency.  This follows 
from the definition of the exchange rate as units of home currency per unit of FX, e.g. 
rupiah per USD.  The data of section IV show that ASEAN REERs weighted by export 
shares, import shares, and total trade move very closely together.  This is due to the 
similarity in their trade patterns, shown in section III.  For clarity, we focus here on the 
total trade-weighted REERs. 
  The REER paths in Graph 2.8 generally show a downward concavity from 1990 
to 1996.  There is an initial period of depreciation from 1990 to 1992, a more-or-less flat 
period from 1992 to 1994, and then an appreciation in 1995-1996.  Again, the main 
exception is Singapore, with a real appreciation from 1989 to 1996, consistent with its 
rapid growth shown in Graph 2.1 earlier.  Combined with the growing current account 
deficits in Graph 2.8, the REER paths are consistent with an unsustainability that 
developed into a bubble in the ASEAN FX markets, as shown analytically in Branson 
(2005). 
  The initial real depreciations in 1990-93 were broadly consistent with stable 
adjustment.  They could contribute to correction of the current deficits.  But the flattening 
out of the REER paths and the turn to real appreciation was a signal that the economies 
were moving away from equilibrium.  The real appreciations would contribute to further 
growth in the current account deficits, rather than correcting them.  As the markets saw 
this growing contradiction, speculation on depreciation developed, with the initial 
pressure on Thailand, the country with the rapidly growing debt ratio.  The   11 
unsustainability of the underlying macro policies combined with the lack of coordination 
of exchange rate policy set the stage for the crisis that began with Thailand in July 1997. 
 
Crisis, 1997-99.  The crisis is clear in Tables 2.1-2.2 and Graphs 2.4-2.8.  The collapse of 
the REERs of all the core ASEANs except Singapore is evident in Graph 2.8.  The real 
depreciations in that graph range from 20 percent for the Philippines to 40 percent for 
Indonesia.  With external debt denominated in FX and domestic assets in home currency, 
this collapse led to failures of financial institutions and a breakdown in credit.  This 
phenomenon, in which currency crisis spreads to the financial sector is well known in the 
economic literature and is known as a “twin crisis”.  As the currencies collapsed, so did 
the local financial institutions, whose large dollar exposures were no longer matched by 
equivalent local currency assets.  The financial collapse was precipitous.  In Thailand, for 
example, 56 out of 91 finance companies were eventually liquidated.  Similarly dramatic 
levels of collapse were seen elsewhere, especially in Korea and Indonesia (see for 
example, Radelet and Sachs, 1998).  All of this combined with a major increase in 
uncertainty leading to the investment collapses shown in Graph 2.4.  Investment fell by 
more than 50 percent in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand and 25 percent in the 
Philippines.  It fell even more steeply from 1997 to 2003 in Singapore.  This investment 
collapse generated the recessions in GDP shown earlier in Graph 2.3. 
The effects of the crisis on poverty are well documented (e.g. the World Bank’s 
East Asia Update for September 2000).  The crisis itself generated recessions and sharp 
increases in poverty across the region.  Moreover, its costs in this regard have often been 
understated as, in the absence of the crisis, poverty rates would have declined further 
below pre-crisis levels. The effects of the crisis on poverty levels are summarized in 
Table 2.3.  The table shows the substantial progress in reducing poverty across the region 
between 1990 and 1996, with the headcount percentage below $1 and $2 a day falling 
markedly.  The crisis sees a strong reversal between 1996 and 1999, with the headcount 
living at under $2 a day in 2002 still well above the 1996 level. 
  The results for external balance can be seen in Graph 2.6.  With saving ratios 
fairly stable and investment collapsing, the current balances all moved sharply into 
surplus.  This is essentially a macro result, since the currencies all depreciated in real   12 
terms during the crisis.  Graph 2.7 shows the crisis results for external debt ratios.  With 
debt mainly denominated in FX, the depreciations directly increased the debt ratios.  The 
recessions in real GDP added to the increase, most markedly in Indonesia.  Thus the 
investment collapse in the crisis led to the severe recessions, and the shift to current 
account surplus, while the depreciations increased the debt ratios.  The combination of 
real recession, financial failures, and rising import prices contributed to significant 
increases in poverty, reversing the trend of a decade. 
 
Post-crisis, 1999-2004.  Since the crisis, the ASEAN economies have stabilized, with 
lower and slower paths of real growth (Graph 2.3), much lower investment ratios (Graph 
2.4), current account surpluses, except the Philippines (Graph 2.6), and currencies 
depreciated in real terms (Graph 2.8).  The lower investment paths are a serious source of 
concern, since capital formation was a driving force behind the “Asian miracle.”  See 
Alwyn Young (1995) for a fundamental discussion of investment and growth in Asia.   
The domestic saving ratios remain high, as shown in Graph 2.5.  Thus excess saving in 
the region now generates current account surpluses and growth in reserves, as the Central 
Banks hold currencies stable. 
  The relationship between the paths of current account balances in Graph 2.6 and 
REERs in Graph 2.8, the main source of instability before the crisis, is mixed.  The only 
country that stands out is Singapore, with a rising surplus and a depreciating currency, an 
unstable combination.  Indonesia and Malaysia have substantial but decreasing surpluses 
with appreciating currencies in real terms, a stable combination.  Thailand has a falling 
surplus with a slowly depreciating currency, and the Philippines has a small deficit with 
real depreciation.   
In summary, the region has settled on a lower and slower, but stable growth path.  
Macro coordination centered on exchange rate management might have averted the crisis 
by leading to sustainable macro policies and reduced vulnerability to speculation.  This is 
an underlying hypothesis for continued research.  
 
Gains from Cooperative Stabilization.   13 
  Cooperative stabilization against a common currency basket can yield two 
potential additional benefits in addition to the direct benefits of stabilization just 
discussed.  These are analyzed in some detail in Branson (2001).  First, it rules out 
competitive depreciations.  Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the problem.  Once the pressure from 
speculation forced the devaluation in Thailand in July 1997, the other ASEAN countries 
had to follow.  The market understood this, so the pressure moved to Indonesia and 
Malaysia.  These depreciations were not competitive in the sense that they were aimed at 
achieving a competitive edge; they were forced by the market.  But they had the same 
result.  Once one goes, the others have to follow.  This led to overshooting, as is evident 
in the graphs.  A coordinated policy could have attained an orderly group devaluation, if 
needed, without the disorganization that at least partially contributed to financial failures 
and the depth of the recessions.  The competitive nature of the depreciations is based on 
the similarities of the trade structures of the ASEAN economies both in terms of 
commodity composition and markets.  This similarity is shown in section III.  Explicit 
coordination of macro policy could work for sustainability and fit into rules of 
surveillance under the Chiang Mai agreement on reserve sharing.  Implicit signs of 
coordination are discussed in section V. 
  The second benefit is removal of convenient individual country targets from 
potential speculative pressure.  In Asia in 1997, as in Europe in 1992, speculation could 
target the weakest country in the group, and then move sequentially from country to 
country.  Coordinated stabilization with reserve sharing could remove this targeting 
convenience for speculation.  If the coordination is based on an explicit agreement, the 
market will understand that it is facing a cooperative based on shared reserves.  In this 
case, the group can come to a considered decision on dealing with speculative pressures. 
  Cooperative stabilization would be facilitated by development of a common 
currency basket for exchange rate management.  The feasibility of agreement on this 
basket is supported by the similarity of trade composition among the core ASEAN 
countries and China in terms of markets and commodities, as shown in the next section.  
Thus a common basket in terms of currencies of export destination or import source 
could be developed as the basis for exchange rate coordination.  These baskets are 
discussed in section IV.  This could also be the basis for a basket for Asian bond issue.   14 
 
III.  Trade Structure: ASEAN and China. 
  This section presents and analyzes the structure of ASEAN and China trade with 
two objectives.  The first is to develop the basis for weights for baskets of ASEAN 
currencies in terms of major trade partners outside ASEAN and China.  For individual 
countries these would be weights for calculating effective exchange rates, nominal and 
real.  Movements of the real effective exchange rates (REERs) can be used as an 
indicator of existing implicit coordination among the ASEAN+1 countries.  For ASEAN 
as a group, the weights would define a common basket for coordinated management of 
exchange rate policy.  This common basket could also be used as the currency of issue in 
the Asian Bond Market.   
Since the major currencies that are candidates for any basket are identified with 
the countries of issue or the regions using the currency, a discussion of weights for a 
basket must begin with the geographic distribution of trade.  The weights would be based 
on the geographic distribution of trade across sources and destinations.  So we first 
present the structure of trade by markets and sources to develop weights for REERs. 
  The second objective is to evaluate the case for some form of monetary 
integration of ASEAN+1 based on the commodity composition of trade.  Here we reflect 
the original view of the basis for optimum currency areas of Mundell (1961).  Countries 
with similar structures of trade by commodity are good candidates for integration into a 
currency area.  Thus the next subsection presents the structure of trade of the region by 
commodity classes. 
  The last step is to present a summary of the structure of trade by market and 
commodity.  This summarizes the similarities and differences of trade structure across the 
region.  It can also yield an idea of the effects of stabilizing exchange rates against a 
geographic basket on fluctuations of profitability across commodity-producing sectors.  
The last subsection therefore turns to the structure by commodity and market. 
 
Geographic Structure of Trade.   
  The geographic structure of trade for the core ASEAN economies and China is 
summarized in Tables 3.1 for exports and 3.2 for imports for 2003, the latest year   15 
available.  Trade structure does not change very fast over time, so the particular choice of 
year is not crucial.  The tables will be updated as more recent data become available.  
Each table shows the total trade of the ASEAN+1 countries [core ASEAN plus China] in 
$bn, and its percentage distribution across markets for exports and sources for imports.  
We focus on the large ASEANs because inclusion of the small, newer members does not 
change the numbers at all significantly.  The full structure of ASEAN trade is presented 
in appendix tables.  In revision, we expect to integrate Hong Kong’s trade with China.   
  Table 3.1 shows the structure of exports by markets for ASEAN+1.  The first 
column gives total exports, and the rest give the percentage distribution across major 
markets.  Taiwan and Australia are included among the major markets due to their 
regional importance; their shares of ASEAN+1 exports are similar to Korea’s.  In moving 
to weights for REERs, we will concentrate on the six markets that are external to 
ASEAN+1, treating trade in the region as internal.  Here we begin with the broader 
picture.  We note for future reference and research that the total value of Singapore’s 
trade is exaggerated by its entrepot nature.  It is not clear what, if any, effect this has on 
its trade distribution. 
  A first thing to notice in Table 3.1 is that the distribution of China’s exports 
across markets is very similar to ASEAN’s.  The shares of the main six markets in the 
last row of the table fit right into the ASEAN pattern.  This also holds for import sources 
in Table 3.2.  This similarity of the geographic distribution of trade of ASEAN and China 
is a first indicator that the two may be good candidates for monetary coordination.  We 
also note that total ASEAN exports at $427 bn are about the same as China’s. 
Turning to some of the notable details of the table, we note that the share of 
ASEAN internal exports ranges from 17 to 28 percent.  The share of China’s exports to 
ASEAN is smaller, as are ASEAN’s to China, around 6-7 percent.  Thus as of 2003, 
ASEAN was a denser trade area than ASEAN-China.  The total share of the three largest 
markets {Japan, US, Europe} for all seven countries is in the range of 42 percent for 
Malaysia to 52 percent for Philippines.  Again, China fits into the ASEAN distribution 
here.  If we look at China separately, we see that the share of ASEAN exports to China 
falls between the large three markets {Japan, US, Europe}, and the smaller three {Korea, 
Taiwan, Australia}.   16 
The export market data of Table 3.1 would support the adoption of a common 
currency basket by both ASEAN and China including either the three largest markets 
{Japan, US, Europe}, or all six including {Korea, Taiwan, Australia}.  Later we focus on 
REERs defined using the six-currency basket. 
Table 3.2 shows the structure of imports by source for ASEAN+1.  The table is 
set up the same as Table 3.1.  As in Table 3.1, the distribution of China’s imports across 
source is quite similar to ASEAN’s.  China’s shares of imports from Korea and Taiwan 
are larger than ASEAN’s, and the shares of the US and Australia are smaller.  But the 
overall impression is that China’s import pattern from the major markets fits into the 
ASEAN pattern, potentially supporting an argument for coordination.  ASEAN’s total 
imports of $356 bn are about the same as China’s $413bn.  Thus in terms of trade 
volumes, aggregate ASEAN and China are about the same size. 
The share of ASEAN internal imports in Table 3.2 ranges from 17 to 29 percent, 
the same as the case for exports.  The share of China’s imports from ASEAN is smaller 
share, as are the shares of ASEAN imports from China.  Thus on the import side intra-
ASEAN trade is also denser then that between ASEAN and China.  The total share of the 
three largest sources in imports is in the range of 39 percent for China to 48 percent for 
Philippines.  The ASEANs are all in the range 40-50 percent.  These total shares for the 
major sources are smaller than for exports, especially for China, with 51 percent for 
exports and 39 percent for imports.  The US shares of imports in Table 3.2 are all smaller 
than the export shares in Table 3.1.  Thus the imbalance between the export share and the 
import share for the three largest trading partners may be due to the US trade imbalance.  
As in the case of exports, the share of China in ASEAN imports falls between the three 
largest sources {Japan, US, Europe} and the three smaller ones {Korea, Taiwan, 
Australia}. 
The import source data of Table 3.2 would also support the adoption of a common 
currency basket by both ASEAN and China.  Later we see that the movements of import-
weighted and export-weighted REERs are quite similar across the ASEAN countries and 
China. 
 
Commodity or Sector Structure of Trade.     17 
  The commodity structure of trade at the one-digit SIC level of the ASEAN 
countries and China (in 2002) is summarized in Tables 3.3 for exports and 3.4 for 
imports.  The tables separate the founding “core” ASEANs from the later entrants plus 
Brunei.  The latter are much smaller individually and in aggregate and have very different 
trade structures.  China and China including Hong Kong are also presented separately, 
mainly due to the entrepot nature of Hong Kong’s trade.  [This problem is more striking 
and difficult in the case of Singapore]  Inclusion of Hong Kong with China does not 
affect the data or conclusions significantly at this level of aggregation.  The analytically 
important one-digit SIC sectors are disaggregated in Appendix Tables A3.3 and A3.6. 
  Table 3.3 for exports shows clearly the results of the “Asian miracle.”  SIC 7 is 
the dominant export sector for all of core ASEAN but Indonesia. [The 42.3 percent in 
SIC 9 for Philippines is probably unclassified SIC 6-8.  Further work is coming on this.  
See also Myanmar.]  The largest share of Indonesia’s exports (in 2002) is in SIC 3, which 
includes oil.  But if SIC 2 and 3 for Indonesia are excluded, the 16.8 percent in SIC 7 
becomes 25 percent, still much less than the other core ASEANs.  China’s share of SIC 7 
is about the same as Philippines and Thailand.  If SIC 7 and 8 are aggregated, the 
commodity structure of China’s exports fits into the ASEAN pattern, as with the market 
distribution earlier.  China and the recent ASEAN entrants also have large shares in SIC 
8, which includes apparel as is seen below.  This is a major difference from the core 
ASEANs.  
  Table 3.4 for imports shows a pattern that is dominated by manufactures (SIC 6-
8), as is normal for industrializing countries.  The core ASEANs (except Indonesia) and 
China, show particularly high shares in SIC 7.  This is also the case for Laos and Brunei.  
Indonesia’s import structure more closely resembles Vietnam.  However, no particular 
pattern stands out in Table 3.4.  Again, the structure of China’s trade resembles that of 
the ASEANs. 
  Disaggregated SIC categories 6-8 at the 2-digit level are shown for exports and 
imports in Appendix Tables A3.3 and A3.4.  [Appendix Tables are available directly 
from the authors.]  There several patterns stand out.  These are extracted into Table 3.5.  
On the export side in Table 3.5, the importance of SIC 75-77 for the core ASEANs and 
China is clear.  Here again, China’s trade fits in with ASEAN.  The importance of SIC   18 
84-85 for the other ASEANs and to a smaller degree China is also clear.  These are the 
apparel exporters of the region.   
On the import side in Table 3.5, SIC 77 stands out for the core ASEANs and to a 
lesser extent China, reflecting intra-industry trade in electrical machinery.  SIC 65 stands 
out for the other ASEANs.  Their apparel industry imports textiles, to some extent from 
China -- see China’s 5 percent in imports in SIC 65 in Table 3.5) -- and exports the 
finished product.  This is also a pattern in S. Asia, especially Sri Lanka.  These 
disaggregated data reinforce the similarity of China’s trade to ASEAN’s, an important 
condition for monetary coordination. 
 
Trade by Sector and Market.   
  In this subsection we summarize the data on trade of core ASEAN and China by 
sector and market for exports and source by imports in SIC 6-8.  The full set of data is in 
Appendix Tables A3.5 and A3.6.  This will give us information on potential differential 
effects on sectors of coordinating exchange rate policies on a common basket.  The same 
movement of the exchange rate would have differing effects on the aggregate economy of 
each country depending on the sectors with the largest differences in trade shares across 
markets and sources.  Similar distributions of trade by sectors and markets or sources will 
minimize differential impacts within the economies; dissimilar distributions will increase 
these differences, making coordination more costly.  We see here that the distributions of 
shares across markets for the major commodities are fairly even, minimizing this source 
of disruption from coordination on a common basket. 
  Tables 3.6-3.8 show the distributions of manufactured exports by markets for the 
core ASEAN countries and China in SIC 6-8.  The entries in each line show first the 
fraction of total exports in the SIC category, and then the share of total exports in that 
category separately to each market.  The total shares for SIC 7 in Table 3.7 are the largest 
for the core ASEANs except Indonesia, and for China.  More than half of total exports 
are SIC 7 for Malaysia and Singapore.  With some exceptions, exports in Tables 6-8 are 
evenly distributed across markets.  Notable exceptions might be the small share of the US 
in Malaysia’s exports in SIC 6 and the large share in SIC 7; and the small share of the US   19 
in Philippines exports of SIC 7.  These sectors could be differentially affected by 
movements of the US dollar within a common basket.  
Tables 3.9-3.11 show the same distributions for imports by source.  These 
distributions seem even more even than for exports.  One exception might be the low US 
shares of SIC 6 exports to Malaysia and Philippines in Table 3.9.  To summarize, the data 
of Tables 3.6-3.12 do not show serious imbalances across major sources and markets in 
the distributions of trade by sectors.  Thus coordinated exchange-rate stabilization against 
a common basket based on these sources and markets should not create substantial 
differential sectoral pressures within ASEAN or China. 
 
IV.  Currency Baskets and Real Effective Exchange Rates. 
  This section discusses the construction of currency baskets and REER indexes for 
the core ASEAN countries and China.  These are based on trade of ASEAN+1 outside 
this region, since the focus of the study at this stage is on first intra-ASEAN coordination, 
and then coordination of ASEAN with China.  Similar baskets and REERs can be 
calculated for the ASEAN member’s largest trading partners, regardless of region, or for 
ASEAN+2 or 3 against major trading partners outside the region.  The requisite data are 
readily available.  We begin by presenting the alternative weights for exports, imports, 
and total trade, based on the data from section III.  Next the alternative REER measures 
are shown and discussed.  We see that their movements are quite similar across indexes 
(exports, imports, total trade) and countries, confirming the case for coordination. 
The REERs combine movement of nominal exchange rates and domestic price 
levels, both at least partially under the control of the domestic monetary authority, and 
trading partner’s price levels, which are independent of domestic policy.  Therefore, the 
similarity of movement of REERs across countries implies some form of policy 
management of movements of domestic inflation and the nominal exchange rate that 
maintains this similarity in REER movements.  This is presumably aimed at maintaining 
competitiveness in the region without competitive devaluations.  To analyze this policy 
management we show the decomposition of movements of the import-weighted REERs 
at the end of the section. 
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Weights for Currency Baskets.   
  The weights for currency baskets based on exports, imports, and total trade of 
ASEAN plus China are shown in Tables 4.1-4.3.  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are taken directly 
from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, scaled to 100.  Table 4.3 is based on the total shares from Tables 
3.1 and 3.2.  The trade shares are quite similar across countries in each table, and across 
tables.  Exceptions might be Indonesia, with a high weight for Japan and a low weight for 
the US on the export side, and Thailand, with a high weight for Japan on the import side.  
The weights for China are well within the ASEAN distribution in all three tables.   
The similarities of the weights among the ASEAN countries suggest that a 
common currency basket could fit ASEAN.  This would serve for coordination of 
exchange-rate policy and as the basis for security issuance in the ABM.  Clearly common 
weights would have to be the subject of eventual discussion and negotiation within 
ASEAN. The similarity of ASEAN weights to China suggests that eventual coordination 
of ASEAN exchange-rate policy on a similar basket as China could be feasible.  A 
common basket would fit both fairly well. 
 
REER Indexes.   
  Graphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the movements of the REER indexes using the 
alternative weights from Table 4.1-4.3.  The export-weighted and total trade indexes use 
GDP price indexes, which include exports but not imports.  The import-weighted indexes 
use CPIs, which include imports but not exports.  The ASEAN indexes for total trade 
from Graph 4.3 are the ones used in Graph 2.8 earlier.  All three graphs show the stable 
pattern of REERs before and after the crisis of 1997-98.  The REERs of the core 
ASEANs except Singapore show sharp depreciations in the crisis period.  Singapore has a 
milder depreciation of about 15-20 percent from 1996 to 1999 on export and total trade 
basis, but only 5 percent on import basis.  China’s REER moved differently, with an early 
appreciation in 1995-97, and then a small depreciation.  Thus Singapore and China 
escaped the contagion of the crisis. 
The graphs show the highly similar movements of the country indexes across sets 
of weights.  This is expected from Tables 4.1-4.3, where country weights are similar 
across baskets.  They also show similar movements across the ASEAN countries, with   21 
China moving somewhat independently.  Before and after the crisis, though, the REER 
indexes, including China, show no trend or tendency to diverge.  They tend to stay within 
a fairly well-defined range.  After 2000, they seem to tend to converge.  This suggests 
that policies are at work in the background that tend to stabilize REERs in the region, and 
even make them tend to converge.  Such policies would be consistent with an implicit 
coordination of nominal exchange rate movements aimed at REER stability that 
maintains competitive positions.  This policy stance can be seen when the REER 
movements are decomposed into their nominal components. 
The broad synchronicity of the REER movements across the ASEAN+1 countries 
tells us that it would be possible to construct a common basket with relative ease.  The 
relative export and total trade weightings behind these graphs (and shown in Tables 4.1 
and 4.3) support this case.  The trade structure of these countries is broadly similar, with 
each country having roughly the same proportions of trade with major trading partners 
such as Japan, the U.S. and Europe.  It would therefore be possible to construct a basket 
currency based on external or total trade and the regional governments could use this 
currency as a focal point against which to coordinate exchange rate policy.  In a similar 
way the countries of the European Monetary System (EMS) used the basket European 
Currency Unit (ECU) to coordinate their exchange rate policies (though with the 
distinction that the ECU was an internally based basket currency).  Such a basket 
currency could be used to manage regional stabilization and to address such specific 
regional concerns as export competitiveness and the response to externally driven shocks.  
It would also be a natural unit of denomination for ABM issues. 
 
Nominal Components of REERs. 
  The REER is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price levels.  
Specifically here it is constructed as the product of a nominal exchange rate index times 
the ratio of a trading partner’s price index to the domestic price index.  In symbols, the 
REER index e is defined as  e = EP
*/P, where E is the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) index and P
* is the trading partners’ price index, all defined by the same set of 
weights, and P is the domestic price index.  The trading partner’s price index P
* is not 
substantially affected by domestic policies, but the NEER and P are.  Thus policy to   22 
stabilize a REER must work on the co-movement of E and P to be consistent with that of 
P
*.  For example, with a stable P
*, domestic inflation in P must be matched by 
depreciation of E.  This is illustrated in Graphs 4.4-4.6.  These show the components of 
the REERs weighted by import shares.  These are chosen because they use CPIs as the 
price indexes.  These tend to be the focus of inflation perceptions and policies more than 
GDP deflators. 
  Graph 4.4 shows the movement of the weighted CPIs for trading partners.  These 
are the P
* indexes.  They move closely together since they differ only in their weights 
across countries, which we have seen are quite similar.  The graph shows a general 
inflationary trend of about 2 percent per year for trading partners.  Graph 4.5 shows 
highly divergent movements of domestic price indexes, the Ps.  These range from nearly 
flat for Singapore to an average of about 11.5 percent a year for Indonesia, with a jump in 
the crisis.  Graph 4.6 shows the movement of the nominal exchange rate indexes E.  
These are similar to the movements of the price indexes in the previous graph.  Thus 
policy pressures on domestic price levels and nominal exchange rates tend to produce 
parallel movements that produce the stability of REERs shown earlier. 
  Coordination of macro policies in ASEAN would work on both nominal variables 
P and E.  Coordination of sustainable macro policies domestically can work to stabilize 
price levels P across countries around an acceptable rate of inflation.  This is the 
objective of surveillance.  Coordination of exchange-rate policies can work to stabilize E.  
The combination would maintain stable and competitive REERs with an acceptable 
inflation trend in the region.  In the absence of sustainable domestic macro policies that 
stabilize P around the acceptable trend, price levels will diverge as in Graph 4.5, and 
require trends in nominal exchange rates to maintain stability in REERs.  A combination 
of surveillance of sustainable domestic macro policies and coordinated exchange rate 
policies would be a macropolicy coordination package promoting growth and poverty 
reduction. 
 
V.  Implicit Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Coordination. 
  There is already a surprising degree of implicit coordination of exchange rate 
policies among the ASEAN countries, or even the ASEAN+3.  Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show   23 
the correlations of monthly changes of USD exchange rates for the ASEAN+3 countries 
for the post-crisis period.  Table 5.2 shows the full group and Table 5.1 eliminates the 
smaller ASEANs.  In Table 1 all the correlations are positive.  The correlations for China 
and Malaysia are small, since these countries essentially fixed their currencies against the 
USD during this period.  The others show generally strong positive correlations, 
indicating common co-movements against the dollar.   
Similar results are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for monthly changes in reserve 
money.  These are all quite positive for core ASEAN and ASEAN+1, indicating 
monetary policy movement consistent with effective exchange rate coordination.  These 
results show that movement to explicit coordination does not require a large change in 
actual policy positions.  The ASEANs, and ASEAN plus China, already conduct 
monetary policy in such a way as to maintain stability in exchange rates and REERs, as 
seen in section IV.  The policies are implicitly coordinated, as seen in the correlations 
here.  A movement to explicit coordination would present a common posture to the 
markets and diffuse speculative pressure when it arises.  It would also support reserve-
sharing as under the CMI.  This could permit the release of reserves to be invested as 
paid-in capital into an ADF that could leverage it in international markets to become a 
real influence for development in the region. 
 
VI.  Conclusions and Further Research 
This paper has examined the prospects for macro policy and exchange rate 
coordination in Asia (in particular in the ASEAN and in the ASEAN and China area) and 
looked at the potential implications of such coordination for reserve sharing and financial 
developments such as the ADF and the ABM.  The paper makes an assessment of the 
gains from such coordination.  The direct gains from exchange rate management come 
from the stability provided by the underlying macro policies and the resulting 
minimization of risk to investors.  The paper looks at the loss from non-stabilization in 
terms of the economic over-heating leading to the crisis of 1997-9; the loss of output and 
poverty growth from the crisis; and the depressed investment and slower growth since the 
crisis.  We argue that better coordination of the underlying macro policies could have 
prevented or minimized such costs, in particular with beneficial consequences for pre-  24 
crisis policy, the control of exposure to speculative contagion and for post-crisis 
investment recovery. 
We argue that the existing geographic and commodity structure of the region’s 
trade mean that REER’s already move together, ensuring a minimum autonomy loss from 
policy coordination.  We look at the geographic structure of trade, using this to develop 
weights for baskets of ASEAN currencies in terms of major trade partners outside 
ASEAN and China.  Such weights are broadly similar for the main ASEAN countries.  
The movements of real effective exchange rates are also broadly synchronous.  This 
highlights an existing implicit coordination amongst the ASEAN+1 countries and 
suggests that use of a common basket for exchange rate coordination would not mark a 
radical departure for existing policies or from domestic autonomy.  We additionally look 
at the commodity composition of trade for the ASEAN+1 countries.  Once again, this 
composition is broadly similar for the larger ASEAN+1 countries (SIC 7 being the 
dominant export sector and the manufactures of SIC6-8 dominating imports).  Such a 
similar commodity structure implies greater benefits from coordination, as argued by 
Mundell’s Optimal Currency Area theory.  Overall, the trade data by both sector and 
geography show no serious imbalances across major sources and markets.  A coordinated 
exchange rate stabilization against a common basket based on these sources and markets 
shouldn’t create substantial differential pressures within ASEAN or China. 
We construct real and nominal effective exchange rate measures for the countries 
of the region.  These rates show the moves toward integration already in practical effect 
in the region and underline the ease of any potential transition toward greater 
coordination.  In particular, they highlight how an externally-based currency basket might 
easily be constructed, offering a focal point for greater regional integration.  Similar to 
the European Currency Unit in the European Monetary System, such a basket currency 
could permit greater coordination of regional policies, addressing particular regional 
concerns regarding competitiveness and the response to externally-driven shocks or 
cascading speculation.  It would yield direct benefits for growth and poverty reduction, as 
well as setting the foundation for further cooperation in the areas of reserve sharing and 
developing the ABM.  The regional currency unit would provide a natural basis for the 
denomination of ABM issues.   25 
  We see this paper as the first part of a broader study of exchange rate and 
monetary coordination in the region.  In further research we propose to build on this 
analysis and look more closely at reserve sharing and the ABM.  As we have outlined in 
Figure 1, we see all of these as closely tied together.  We also intend to look more closely 




Branson, William H., 2001, “Intermediate Exchange-rate Regimes for Groups of 
Developing Countries,” in J.B.de Macedo, D. Cohen, and H. Reisen (eds), Don’t Fix, 
Don’t Float  OECD, Paris, 2001. 
 
Branson, William H., 2005, “The Asian Crisis as a Bubble in Foreign Exchange 
Markets,” mimeo. 
 
Kuroda Haruhilo, Kawai, Masahiro, 2003, “Strengthening Regional Financial 
Cooperation in East Asia,”  PRI Discussion Papers 03A-10 (May 2003), Policy Research 
Institute, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo. 
 
Mundell, Robert, 1961, "A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas," American Economic 
Review (September 1961) vol.51 pp.657-65. 
 
Nasution Anwar, 2005, “Regional Financial Arrangements in East Asia,” AEA-ACAES 
Joint Meetings (January 2005), forthcoming in Journal of Asian Economics. 
 
Radelet Steven, Sachs Jeffrey, 1988, “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis,” 
NBER Working Papers 6680 (August 1988), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
World Bank, 2000, “East Asia Update, Special Focus: Poverty During Crisis & 
Recovery”, World Bank, East Asia and Pacific publications, (September 18, 2000)  pp.1-
6. 
 
Young Alwyn, 1995, “The Tyranny of Numbers:  Confronting the Statistical Realities of 
the East Asian Growth Experience.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (August 
1995):  641-680. 










Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04
Indonesia Thailand Singapore Malaysia Philippines
 
Source: Global Financial Data 
Graph 2.2: Monthly exchange rates for core ASEAN, excluding Indonesia, December 31 
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Graph 2.6: External balance on goods and services (% GDP) 
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Graph 2.8: Real effective exchange rate 
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Source: Global Financial data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank WDITable 2.1: External balance, investment, savings and debt for Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Indonesia                             
Ext. balance, goods 
& services (% GDP) 
1.6  1.7  2.9  3.0  1.1  -1.3  -0.6  -0.3  9.8  8.1  9.5  7.4  6.6  5.5 
Gross capital 
formation (% GDP) 
30.7  31.6  30.5  29.5  31.1  31.9  30.7  31.8  16.8  11.4  16.1  17.4  15.7  16.0 
Gross domestic 
savings (% GDP) 
32.3  33.2  33.4  32.5  32.2  30.6  30.1  31.5  26.5  19.5  25.6  24.9  22.2  21.5 
External debt, total 
(DOD, current US$) 
69,872  79,548  88,002  89,172  107,824  124,398  128,937  136,161  151,236  151,201  144,407  134,045  131,755  134,389 
GDP (current US$)  114,427  128,168  139,116  158,007  176,892  202,132  227,370  215,749  95,446  140,001  150,196  143,034  172,971  208,312 
Ext. debt, % GDP  61.1%  62.1%  63.3%  56.4%  61.0%  61.5%  56.7%  63.1%  158.5%  108.0%  96.1%  93.7%  76.2%  64.5% 
Malaysia                              
Ext. balance, goods 
& services (% GDP) 
2.1  -3.7  1.4  -0.1  -1.6  -3.9  1.4  0.9  22.0  25.1  20.0  18.4  18.3  21.0 
Gross capital 
formation (% GDP) 
32.4  37.8  35.4  39.2  41.2  43.6  41.5  43.0  26.7  22.4  27.3  23.9  23.8  21.4 
Gross domestic 
savings (% GDP) 
34.5  34.1  36.7  39.1  39.6  39.7  42.9  43.9  48.7  47.4  47.3  42.3  42.1  42.3 
External debt, total 
(DOD, current US$) 
15,328  17,080  20,018  26,149  30,336  34,343  39,673  47,228  42,409  41,903  41,941  44,612  48,833  49,074 
GDP (current US$)  44,024  49,134  59,151  66,894  74,481  88,832  100,852  100,169  72,175  79,148  90,320  88,001  95,164  103,737 
Ext. debt, % GDP  34.8%  34.8%  33.8%  39.1%  40.7%  38.7%  39.3%  47.1%  58.8%  52.9%  46.4%  50.7%  51.3%  47.3% 
Philippines                             
Ext. balance, goods 
& services (% GDP) 
-5.8  -3.0  -4.9  -8.4  -6.3  -7.8  -8.8  -10.3  -6.6  0.2  1.9  -3.1  -0.5  -2.5 
Gross capital 
formation (% GDP) 
24.2  20.2  21.3  24.0  24.1  22.5  24.0  24.8  20.3  18.4  21.2  20.6  19.3  18.7 
Gross domestic 
savings (% of GDP) 
18.4  17.2  16.4  15.5  17.8  14.6  15.2  14.4  13.7  18.6  23.1  17.5  18.8  16.2 
External debt, total 
(DOD, current US$) 
30,580  32,494  33,220  36,143  40,257  39,391  44,031  50,746  53,529  58,063  60,850  58,499  60,090  62,663 
GDP (current US$)  44,331  45,417  52,977  54,368  64,085  74,120  82,847  82,343  65,172  76,157  75,913  72,043  77,954  80,574 
Ext. debt, % GDP  69.0%  71.5%  62.7%  66.5%  62.8%  53.1%  53.1%  61.6%  82.1%  76.2%  80.2%  81.2%  77.1%  77.8% 
Source: All World Bank, World Development Indicators Table 2.2: External balance, investment, savings and debt for Singapore and Thailand 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Singapore                             
Ext. balance, goods 
& services (% GDP) 
6.9  10.6  9.7  7.8  14.9  16.1  14.4  12.2  21.0  17.8  16.1  19.4  22.8  33.3 
Gross capital 
formation (% GDP) 
36.4  34.5  35.8  37.4  33.1  34.1  35.9  39.2  32.3  32.4  32.4  25.2  21.2  13.4 
Gross domestic 
savings (% of GDP) 
43.3  45.1  45.5  45.2  48.0  50.2  50.3  51.4  53.3  50.3  48.5  44.6  43.9  46.7 
External debt, 
(current US$m) 
3,772  4,369  4,582  5,524  7,594  8,368  9,802  11,803  12,093  13,701  15,623  18,361  20,657  22,218 
GDP (current US$)  36,901  43,191  49,863  58,355  70,610  83,933  92,221  95,395  81,911  81,381  91,476  84,871  88,275  91,342 
Ext. debt, % GDP  10.2%  10.1%  9.2%  9.5%  10.8%  10.0%  10.6%  12.4%  14.8%  16.8%  17.1%  21.6%  23.4%  24.3% 
Thailand                             
Ext. balance, goods 
& services (% GDP) 
-7.5  -6.5  -4.0  -4.2  -4.8  -6.7  -6.3  1.4  15.9  12.6  8.6  6.5  7.2  6.7 
Gross capital 
formation (% GDP) 
41.4  42.8  40.0  40.0  40.3  42.1  41.8  33.7  20.4  20.5  22.8  24.1  23.9  25.2 
Gross domestic 
savings (% of GDP) 
33.8  36.3  36.0  35.8  35.4  35.4  35.5  35.1  36.3  33.1  31.4  30.6  31.1  32.0 
External debt, total 
(DOD, current US$) 
28,095  37,703  41,784  52,638  65,533  100,039  112,838  109,699  104,917  96,770  79,710  67,181  59,459  51,793 
GDP (current US$)  85,345  98,234  111,453  125,009  144,527  167,896  181,689  150,892  111,860  122,338  122,725  115,536  126,770  142,953 
Ext. debt, % GDP  32.9%  38.4%  37.5%  42.1%  45.3%  59.6%  62.1%  72.7%  93.8%  79.1%  64.9%  58.1%  46.9%  36.2% 
Source: All World Bank, World Development Indicators except Singapore external debt from Economist data Table 2.3: Regional aggregates for % of poor at $1 and $2 per day in East Asia 5* 
  1990  1996  1999  2000  2001  2002 
$1 per day  15.6  6.9  9.0  8.0  7.0  6.2 
$2 per day  53.3  38.5  46.2  44.7  42.8  41.1 
*The East Asia 5 comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand        
Source: World Bank, East Asia Update, September 2000 
 
 
Table 3.1: Export distribution by market, ASEAN+1, 2003 data 
  Total  Japan  Korea  US  EU  Taiwan  Australia  ASEAN  China  Other 
  (bn, $)  Market distribution 
Indonesia  60.995  22.3%  7.1%  12.1%  13.1%  3.7%  2.9%  17.6%  6.2%  15.0% 
Malaysia  104.966  10.7%  2.9%  19.6%  12.1%  3.6%  2.5%  24.8%  6.5%  17.3% 
Philippines  36.225  15.9%  3.6%  20.1%  16.3%  6.9%  0.9%  18.2%  5.9%  12.3% 
Thailand   80.521  14.2%  2.0%  17.0%  14.7%  3.2%  2.7%  20.6%  7.1%  18.5% 
Singapore  144.121  6.7%  4.2%  14.3%  13.4%  4.8%  3.2%  27.9%  7.0%  18.4% 
China  438.25  13.6%  4.6%  21.1%  16.5%  2.1%  1.4%  7.1%    33.7% 
China + HK  490.358  14.6%  5.0%  27.4%  20.8%  2.9%  1.8%  9.1%    18.3% 
Core ASEAN  426.828                   
Source: IMF DOTS 2004 Yearbook 
 
 
Table 3.2: Import distribution by market, ASEAN+1, 2003 data 
  Total  Japan  Korea  US  EU  Taiwan  Australia  ASEAN  China  Other 
  (bn, $)  Source distribution 
Indonesia  32.544  13.0%  4.7%  8.3%  10.9%  2.7%  5.1%  23.8%  9.1%  22.5% 
Malaysia  82.726  17.3%  5.5%  15.5%  11.8%  5.0%  1.5%  24.4%  8.8%  10.1% 
Philippines  37.5  20.4%  6.4%  19.8%  8.0%  5.0%  1.3%  17.1%  4.8%  17.3% 
Thailand   75.809  24.1%  3.9%  9.5%  10.0%  4.3%  2.1%  16.6%  8.0%  21.6% 
Singapore  127.996  12.5%  3.7%  14.1%  12.5%  5.1%  1.7%  28.6%  8.7%  13.3% 
China  412.836  18.0%  10.4%  8.2%  12.9%  12.0%  1.8%  11.5%    25.3% 
China + HK  533.002  19.1%  10.2%  8.8%  13.6%  12.3%  1.7%  14.0%    20.4% 
Core ASEAN  356.575                   
Source: IMF DOTS 2004 Yearbook 
 
 
 Table 3.3: Commodity exports to the world, % of total exports for each sector by country, 2002 
SIC code  Core ASEAN countries  Other ASEAN  China 
  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Sing.  Vietnam  Myanmar  Cambodia  Laos  Brunei  China  China+HK 
Total, $ bn  61.264  101.797  38.176  75.043  127.894  16.847  2.639  1.909  0.330  4.074  358.565  564.977 
0-Food  6.3%  2.1%  3.9%  12.3%  1.5%  17.4%  21.5%  0.8%  4.7%  0.0%  4.4%  3.2% 
1-Beverages  0.5%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.8%  0.1%  0.5%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.3%  0.3% 
2-Crude materials  8.0%  2.3%  0.9%  3.9%  0.6%  2.4%  12.6%  1.4%  4.6%  0.0%  1.4%  1.2% 
3-Fuels, lubricants & related materials  24.4%  8.5%  1.1%  2.1%  6.9%  19.2%  1.1%  0.0%  0.0%  88.2%  2.6%  1.7% 
4-Animal & vegetable oils, fats & 
waxes 
4.6%  5.0%  1.0%  0.1%  0.2%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
5-Chemicals & related products, n.e.s.  5.2%  4.6%  1.0%  5.2%  8.7%  1.1%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  4.6%  4.6% 
6-Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material 
19.2%  7.0%  2.9%  10.2%  3.7%  5.3%  2.6%  2.3%  0.7%  1.1%  16.4%  15.4% 
7-Machinery & transport equipment  16.8%  60.3%  39.7%  39.9%  64.5%  7.1%  1.1%  0.2%  0.1%  4.4%  38.6%  40.2% 
8-Miscellaneous manufactured articles  14.5%  8.6%  7.0%  15.6%  8.9%  39.7%  27.9%  93.6%  40.4%  6.1%  31.6%  32.8% 
9-Commodities & trans. not classified 
elsewhere 
0.6%  1.2%  42.3%  10.6%  4.2%  7.6%  32.6%  1.6%  49.5%  0.2%  0.2%  0.5% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division Table 3.4: Commodity imports from the world, % of total imports for each sector by country, 2002 
SIC code  Core ASEAN countries  Other ASEAN  China 
  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Sing.  Vietnam  Myanmar  Cambodia  Laos  Brunei  China  China+HK 
Total, $ bn  28.143  84.884  30.682  53.332  114.596  15.443  2.245  1.546  0.186  1.884  328.045  510.141 
0-Food  11.1%  4.0%  7.8%  3.5%  2.6%  5.1%  5.4%  1.5%  3.3%  9.2%  1.7%  2.3% 
1-Beverages  0.8%  0.5%  2.0%  0.5%  0.7%  2.3%  2.7%  8.9%  16.7%  2.5%  0.1%  0.3% 
2-Crude materials  8.6%  1.9%  2.5%  3.5%  0.6%  2.2%  0.8%  2.1%  0.3%  0.5%  6.6%  4.7% 
3-Fuels, lubricants & related materials  12.8%  4.1%  7.6%  4.7%  10.7%  8.7%  16.1%  8.8%  6.7%  1.4%  5.1%  4.1% 
4-Animal & vegetable oils, fats & 
waxes  0.2%  0.4%  0.2%  0.1%  0.3%  0.5%  2.5%  0.4%  0.0%  0.3%  0.6%  0.4% 
5-Chemicals & related products, n.e.s.  14.6%  6.3%  8.3%  10.8%  5.5%  13.6%  9.3%  5.0%  3.6%  4.4%  12.3%  10.2% 
6-Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material  16.7%  9.6%  11.9%  16.4%  7.7%  26.7%  24.6%  44.8%  14.7%  20.5%  17.8%  18.1% 
7-Machinery & transport equipment  29.8%  63.3%  48.0%  49.9%  57.9%  33.4%  30.5%  17.8%  40.9%  46.9%  46.7%  46.8% 
8-Miscellaneous manufactured articles  3.6%  6.1%  5.2%  6.6%  8.9%  6.0%  5.5%  8.9%  5.5%  10.7%  7.6%  11.1% 
9-Commodities & trans. not classified 
elsewhere  1.8%  3.9%  6.5%  4.0%  5.0%  1.5%  2.6%  1.8%  8.2%  3.7%  1.6%  1.9% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 Table 3.5: Breakdown of key sectors for commodity exports and imports, extracted from tables A3.3 and A3.4, %, 2002 
       
SIC code  Core ASEAN countries  Other ASEAN  China 
EXPORTS  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philipp.  Thai.  Sing.  Vietnam  Myanmar  Camb.  Laos  Brunei  China  China+HK 
                         
6-Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  19.2%  7.0%  2.9%  10.2%  3.7%  5.3%  2.6%  2.3%  0.7%  1.1%  15.4%  15.0% 
65X-Textile yarn,fabrics,made-upart.,related products  5.1%  1.1%  0.7%  2.1%  0.6%  1.8%  0.4%  1.3%  0.1%  0.6%  6.1%  6.1% 
                         
7-Machinery and transport equipment  16.8%  60.3%  39.7%  39.9%  64.5%  7.1%  1.1%  0.2%  0.1%  4.4%  44.0%  43.8% 
75X-Office mach. & automatic data processing equip.  3.8%  19.1%  17.1%  12.3%  21.0%  0.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  12.2%  11.7% 
76X-Telecommunic. & sound recording apparatus  5.9%  11.4%  3.0%  6.7%  6.4%  0.7%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1%  9.2%  9.6% 
77X-Elec. machinery,apparatus & appliances n.e.s.  4.1%  25.9%  16.4%  11.7%  29.8%  3.6%  0.3%  0.1%  0.0%  0.1%  15.1%  15.5% 
                         
8-Miscellaneous manufactured articles  14.5%  8.6%  7.0%  15.6%  8.9%  39.7%  27.9%  93.6%  40.4%  6.1%  27.9%  29.4% 
84X-Articles of apparel and clothing accessories  7.1%  2.1%  3.9%  5.4%  1.4%  14.6%  26.1%  85.6%  38.9%  5.9%  9.8%  8.1% 
851-Footwear  2.0%  0.1%  0.1%  1.2%  0.1%  16.9%  0.8%  7.5%  1.3%  0.0%  2.4%  4.4% 
                         
IMPORTS                         
                         
6-Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  16.7%  9.6%  11.9%  16.4%  7.7%  26.7%  24.6%  44.8%  14.7%  20.5%  16.5%  17.0% 
65X-Textile yarn,fabrics,made-upart.,related products  5.0%  1.4%  3.6%  2.3%  0.9%  9.3%  12.1%  36.7%  8.8%  8.3%  5.0%  5.4% 
                         
7-Machinery and transport equipment  29.8%  63.3%  48.0%  49.9%  57.9%  33.4%  30.5%  17.8%  40.9%  46.9%  45.5%  45.9% 
77X-Elec. machinery,apparatus & appliances n.e.s.  3.2%  37.4%  22.9%  17.6%  24.5%  5.9%  3.4%  1.1%  5.1%  4.6%  18.2%  18.4% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
 
 Table 3.6: SIC-6, Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material export shares to 
markets outside core ASEAN+1 countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  19.2%  16.3%  15.2%  13.3%  18.3%  19.2%  19.0%  25.0% 
Malaysia  7.0%  9.1%  9.7%  2.6%  6.0%  7.9%  10.0%  8.3% 
Philippines  2.9%  3.4%  6.8%  2.3%  1.5%  1.5%  5.9%  3.7% 
Thailand  10.2%  8.7%  14.5%  11.3%  11.7%  13.1%  13.1%  8.8% 
Singapore  3.7%  1.9%  3.1%  0.6%  1.9%  3.4%  4.1%  5.4% 
                 
China  16.4%  12.2%  22.9%  13.2%  13.8%  17.2%  19.1%  20.4% 
China+Hong Kong  15.4%  11.1%  18.8%  11.1%  11.3%  12.2%  16.4%  20.2% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
Table 3.7: SIC-7, Machinery and transport equipment export shares to markets outside 
core ASEAN+1 countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  16.8%  11.6%  6.2%  19.2%  18.3%  7.4%  10.4%  22.6% 
Malaysia  60.3%  42.9%  48.1%  80.6%  62.9%  64.7%  38.3%  56.0% 
Philippines  39.7%  53.2%  26.7%  33.5%  54.9%  33.1%  58.3%  31.3% 
Thailand  39.9%  39.4%  43.7%  39.4%  45.8%  55.3%  44.2%  36.4% 
Singapore  64.5%  59.5%  71.9%  75.7%  71.4%  75.2%  47.2%  59.1% 
                 
China  38.6%  32.4%  30.6%  39.4%  40.0%  50.3%  32.2%  40.7% 
China+Hong Kong  40.2%  33.7%  37.4%  35.5%  38.3%  55.9%  32.1%  44.9% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
Table 3.8: SIC-8, Miscellaneous manufactured articles export shares to markets outside 
core ASEAN+1 countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  14.5%  5.6%  1.9%  43.6%  29.0%  2.1%  7.0%  7.2% 
Malaysia  8.6%  7.5%  2.4%  12.0%  14.0%  3.6%  12.6%  6.6% 
Philippines  7.0%  3.7%  0.9%  18.1%  6.1%  0.6%  8.3%  2.2% 
Thailand  15.6%  14.8%  5.8%  31.9%  26.5%  3.4%  11.3%  4.6% 
Singapore  8.9%  19.1%  9.1%  11.0%  7.9%  5.2%  12.3%  7.5% 
                 
China  31.6%  35.6%  16.5%  41.2%  35.7%  12.9%  38.1%  24.5% 
China+Hong Kong  32.8%  38.3%  17.6%  49.0%  42.2%  16.8%  42.6%  20.8% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division Table 3.9: SIC-6, Manufactured good import shares by source, outside core ASEAN+1 
countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  16.7%  19.5%  36.3%  7.0%  12.0%  36.6%  15.5%  14.2% 
Malaysia  9.6%  15.0%  13.7%  3.0%  9.0%  13.1%  26.7%  8.8% 
Philippines  11.9%  11.2%  17.0%  3.0%  11.4%  18.8%  13.3%  13.1% 
Thailand  16.4%  18.7%  21.5%  7.6%  16.6%  28.0%  26.1%  14.1% 
Singapore  7.7%  9.0%  9.2%  3.8%  9.9%  6.9%  5.4%  7.9% 
                 
China  17.8%  18.5%  24.8%  6.0%  12.7%  24.6%  17.8%  18.0% 
China+Hong Kong  18.1%  16.4%  24.3%  7.6%  16.3%  22.8%  18.4%  18.8% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
Table 3.10: SIC-7, Machinery and transport equipment import shares by source, outside 
core ASEAN+1 countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  29.8%  56.6%  24.0%  35.7%  44.5%  29.5%  13.6%  15.9% 
Malaysia  63.3%  64.6%  75.1%  79.4%  65.1%  72.0%  13.0%  56.8% 
Philippines  48.0%  66.2%  59.9%  66.1%  49.5%  27.2%  6.9%  36.0% 
Thailand  49.9%  60.9%  57.9%  51.2%  46.3%  46.3%  5.8%  45.6% 
Singapore  57.9%  64.2%  71.6%  66.4%  55.7%  80.2%  13.0%  53.1% 
                 
China  46.7%  54.2%  43.5%  54.3%  60.6%  47.5%  5.2%  40.4% 
China+Hong Kong  46.8%  55.4%  46.4%  52.2%  52.8%  51.6%  6.6%  41.9% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
Table 3.11: SIC-8, Miscellaneous manufactured article import shares by source, outside 
core ASEAN+1 countries 
  Total  Japan  Korea  U.S.  Europe  Taiwan  Australia  Other 
Indonesia  3.6%  3.7%  5.4%  2.7%  3.5%  4.1%  1.3%  3.8% 
Malaysia  6.1%  7.3%  2.0%  6.4%  6.6%  4.3%  3.6%  6.1% 
Philippines  5.2%  4.4%  2.6%  4.3%  6.2%  3.4%  3.9%  6.4% 
Thailand  6.6%  6.5%  2.9%  8.7%  10.3%  7.6%  2.7%  5.3% 
Singapore  8.9%  8.2%  3.1%  11.2%  12.3%  5.0%  5.4%  8.5% 
                 
China  7.6%  8.7%  4.7%  9.0%  7.7%  8.7%  2.6%  7.3% 
China+Hong Kong  11.1%  10.2%  4.6%  10.6%  12.4%  7.9%  4.8%  13.1% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
  
Table 4.1: Export shares for weighting real effective exchange rates 
       
  Japan  Korea, Rep.  United States  EU  Taiwan  Australia   
Indonesia  36.5%  11.6%  19.8%  21.4%  6.0%  4.8%  100.0% 
Malaysia  20.8%  5.6%  38.1%  23.6%  7.0%  4.8%  100.0% 
Philippines  25.0%  5.7%  31.6%  25.5%  10.8%  1.4%  100.0% 
Thailand  26.4%  3.7%  31.6%  27.3%  6.0%  5.0%  100.0% 
Singapore  14.4%  9.0%  30.6%  28.7%  10.3%  7.0%  100.0% 
               
China  22.9%  7.7%  35.7%  27.8%  3.5%  2.4%  100.0% 
China+HK  20.1%  6.9%  37.8%  28.6%  4.1%  2.5%  100.0% 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
Table 4.2: Import shares for weighting real effective exchange rates 
Source: World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada. International Trade Division 
 
 
Table 4.3: Trade shares for weighting real effective exchange rates 
       
  Japan  Korea, Rep.  United States  EU  Taiwan  Australia  check 
Indonesia  34.4%  11.3%  19.5%  22.2%  6.0%  6.6%  100.0% 
Malaysia  25.3%  7.5%  33.1%  22.3%  7.8%  3.8%  100.0% 
Philippines  29.2%  8.1%  32.0%  19.4%  9.5%  1.8%  100.0% 
Thailand  35.3%  5.4%  24.8%  23.1%  6.9%  4.5%  100.0% 
Singapore  19.6%  8.2%  29.6%  27.0%  10.2%  5.3%  100.0% 
               
China  22.9%  7.7%  35.7%  27.8%  3.5%  2.4%  100.0% 
China+HK  24.5%  11.2%  25.7%  24.7%  11.3%  2.5%  100.0% 







  Japan  Korea, Rep.  United States  EU  Taiwan  Australia   
Indonesia  29.1%  10.5%  18.6%  24.5%  6.0%  11.3%  100.0% 
Malaysia  30.5%  9.7%  27.4%  20.9%  8.8%  2.7%  100.0% 
Philippines  33.5%  10.5%  32.5%  13.2%  8.2%  2.2%  100.0% 
Thailand  44.8%  7.2%  17.6%  18.6%  7.9%  3.9%  100.0% 
Singapore  25.2%  7.4%  28.5%  25.2%  10.2%  3.5%  100.0% 
               
China  28.4%  16.5%  13.0%  20.3%  18.9%  2.8%  100.0% 
China+HK  29.1%  15.5%  13.4%  20.7%  18.7%  2.5%  100.0% Graph 4.1: Real effective exchange rate, export basis 
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Source: Global Financial data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank WDIGraph 4.2: Real effective exchange rate, import basis 
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Source: Global Financial data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank WDIGraph 4.3: Real effective exchange rate, total trade basis 
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 Graph 4.4: Weighted CPI indices for trading partners, core ASEAN and China+HK 
CPI index of major trading partners for each ASEAN+1 country, 
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Source: Global Financial data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank WDIGraph 4.6: Nominal effective exchange rate, import basis 
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Source: Global Financial data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank WDITable 5.1: Correlation matrix of monthly changes in dollar exchange rates, January 2000- June 2005 
   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  China  Japan  Taiwan  Korea 
Indonesia  1                 
Malaysia  0.15  1               
Philippines  0.39  0.09  1             
Thailand  0.45  0.23  0.57  1           
Singapore  0.54  0.32  0.33  0.65  1         
Japan  0.27  0.29  0.24  0.53  0.64  -0.06  1     
Taiwan  0.11  0.07  0.36  0.62  0.33  -0.11  0.36  1   
Korea  0.25  0.20  0.19  0.47  0.47  -0.01  0.57  0.60  1 
Source: Global Financial Data; Datastream 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix of monthly changes in dollar exchange rates. January 2000- June 2005 
   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  Vietnam  Myanmar  Cambodia  Laos   Brunei  China  Japan  Taiwan  Korea 
Indonesia  1                           
Malaysia  0.15  1                         
Philippines  0.39  0.09  1                       
Thailand  0.45  0.23  0.57  1                     
Singapore  0.54  0.32  0.33  0.65  1                   
Vietnam  -0.07  -0.15  0.31  0.05  0.03  1                 
Myanmar  0.12  0.19  0.16  0.41  0.34  0.00  1               
Cambodia  0.05  0.00  -0.01  0.08  -0.06  -0.17  0.21  1             
Laos   -0.10  -0.02  -0.15  0.00  -0.22  -0.05  -0.03  0.65  1           
Brunei  0.54  0.34  0.33  0.65  0.98  0.02  0.33  -0.04  -0.19  1         
China  -0.18  -0.11  -0.27  -0.07  -0.15  -0.17  0.07  -0.03  0.08  -0.15  1       
Japan  0.27  0.29  0.24  0.53  0.64  0.06  0.35  -0.06  -0.19  0.58  -0.06  1     
Taiwan  0.11  0.07  0.36  0.62  0.33  0.37  0.28  -0.10  0.01  0.33  -0.11  0.36  1   
Korea  0.25  0.20  0.19  0.47  0.47  0.13  0.21  -0.05  -0.08  0.46  -0.01  0.57  0.60  1 
Source: Global Financial Data; Datastream Table 5.3: Correlation matrix of monthly changes in reserves, denominated in LCU (starting Jan 1999
1) 
   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  China  Japan  Taiwan  Korea 
Indonesia  1                 
Malaysia  0.07  1               
Philippines  0.35  0.10  1             
Thailand  0.33  0.34  0.21  1           
Singapore  0.37  0.73  0.29  0.51  1         
Japan  0.37  0.50  0.27  0.47  0.64  1       
Taiwan  0.50  0.34  0.40  0.65  0.61  0.51  1     
Korea  -0.07  0.46  0.07  0.15  0.37  0.33  0.04  1   
1China starting July 99              Source: IMF IFS; Taiwan CBC data 
 
 
Table 5.4: Correlation matrix of monthly changes in reserves, denominated in LCU (starting Jan 1999
2) 
   Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  Vietnam  Myanmar  Cambodia  Laos   China  Japan  Taiwan  Korea 
Indonesia  1                         
Malaysia  0.07  1                       
Philippines  0.35  0.10  1                     
Thailand  0.33  0.34  0.21  1                   
Singapore  0.37  0.73  0.29  0.51  1                 
Vietnam  -0.22  0.55  -0.15  -0.07  0.45  1               
Myanmar  0.00  -0.15  0.06  0.10  0.02  -0.13  1             
Cambodia  -0.08  -0.20  -0.03  -0.11  -0.22  0.05  0.06  1           
Laos   0.19  -0.22  0.11  -0.18  -0.20  -0.10  -0.13  0.04  1         
China  0.37  0.50  0.27  0.47  0.64  0.45  -0.14  -0.13  -0.03  1       
Japan  0.50  0.34  0.40  0.65  0.61  -0.26  0.27  -0.13  -0.11  0.51  1     
Taiwan  -0.07  0.46  0.07  0.15  0.37  0.39  -0.10  -0.04  -0.17  0.33  0.04  1   
Korea  0.35  0.08  0.15  0.42  0.29  -0.07  -0.01  -0.07  -0.12  0.28  0.41  0.18  1 
2China starting July 99, Vietnam missing July-Dec 99; lao missing Mar 05; not including Brunei (pegged to Singapore dollar)      Source: IMF IFS; Taiwan CBC d 